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              | Date: 2001-06-13 
 
 Cybercrime vor Absegnung durch Europarat-.-. --.- -.-. --.- -.-. --.- -.-. --.- -.-. --.- -.-. --.-
 
 q/depesche  01.5.13/1
 
 
 Cybercrime vor Absegnung durch Europarat
 
 Und Last Minute hat man im Europarat plötzlich bemerkt, dass es
 auch eine andere Seite als "Law Enforcement"und Argumente
 gegen die Überwachungstollwut gibt. Ob irgendetwas davon [siehe
 unten] berücksichtig wurde, ist völlig ungewiss. Mehr dazu morgen
 früh.
 
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 Barry Steinhardt
 
 Comments of the American Civil Liberties Union, the Electronic
 Privacy Information Center and Privacy International on Draft 27 of
 the Proposed CoE Convention on Cybercrime
 
 
 
 
 June 7, 2001
 
 
 We are offering this letter of comments to the U.S. Department of
 Justice and the CDPC of the Council of Europe in order to voice our
 continuing concerns regarding the development and form of the
 draft Convention on Cybercrime. While we were advised to reserve
 our comments to optional text and footnotes in order to conform
 with the interests of the CDPC, we also present our continuing
 concerns generally in the hope of promoting democratic debate.
 We represent Non-Governmental Organizations, which are
 members of the Global Internet Liberty Campaign. This letter
 addresses only certain portions of the draft Convention and
 individual signatories may have additional concerns.
 
 We have been actively offering our thoughts on the Convention
 since the drafts were made public. Through the Global Internet
 Liberty Campaign, of which we are members, two letters were
 submitted to the Council of Europe outlining our concerns; these
 concerns still stand. We have also worked with industry actors
 under an ad-hoc group in order to communicate our concerns to
 the U.S. Department of Justice, which reports back that the
 Committee of Experts on Crime in Cyber-Space continues to resist
 our recommendations. We ask that this letter be taken with more
 consideration than past submissions, while bearing in mind our
 previously articulated concerns. A. Process We must again object
 to the non-transparent manner in which this Convention has been
 developed. The CoE has made little effort to address the concerns
 of other stakeholders in the process. Even after the publication of
 Draft 19 and subsequent drafts, we have seen little effort on the
 part of the Council of Europe working group to directly and
 substantially incorporate the views and concerns of the NGO
 community on the issues of privacy and civil liberties. There has
 been limited public input on the convention, while CoE staffers have
 publicly dismissed any critical commentary.
 
 In addition, the makeup of the working party has remained one-
 sided, with law enforcement at the table and no industry or NGO
 participation. This is contrary to similar efforts at the OECD and the
 G-8 where NGOs (albeit in a very limited capacity) and industry
 were asked to participate and a more balanced effort has emerged.
 B. Article 15 is Not Adequate We recognize that the legal
 protections have been modestly improved in Article 15 by the
 reference to various other international instruments, but we still
 believe that the protections it affords are not adequate to address
 the significant demands and requirements for privacy- invasive
 techniques in the rest of the Convention.
 
 Title II sets out very specific requirements for privacy invasive law
 enforcement techniques. We believe and have consistently stated
 publicly that each of those sections should have included
 limitations on the use of the techniques. A vague reference to
 proportionality will not be
 adequate to ensure that civil liberties are protected. We recognize
 that countries have varying methods for protection of civil liberties,
 but as a Council of Europe Convention drafted in consultation with
 other democratic nations, this document missed an important
 opportunity to ensure that minimum standards consistent with the
 European Convention on Human Rights and other international
 human rights accords were actually implemented. This failure is, in
 part, a result of the non-transparency of the process.
 
 It is also unfortunate the section does not specifically address the
 issue of privacy and data protection. The COE Convention 108 on
 Data Protection is an important safeguard for protecting citizen's
 rights and the implementation of this Convention should be adopted
 in a manner that is consistent with its requirements.
 
 Other related efforts such as the 1997 OECD cryptography
 guidelines specifically recognize the fundamental right of privacy:
 
 Article 5. The fundamental rights of individuals to privacy, including
 secrecy of communications and protection of personal data, should
 be respected in national cryptography policies and in the
 implementation and use of cryptographic methods.
 
 Even the recent G8 Tokyo-round documents noted privacy as a
 right that needs to be protected by the democratic nations and fully
 incorporated into procedures for law enforcement investigations.
 
 Similarly, the requirements in 15.2 are vague and unlikely to create
 any significant procedural protections and do not provide for
 adequate independent supervision by judicial or other authorities.
 Independent supervision varies greatly across nations. 15.2 does
 not set any standards for independence, while the Explanatory
 Memorandum (par.138) even notes that a competent authorisation
 across nations differs from "judicial, administrative, or other law
 enforcement authority" (emphasis added). We would expect that
 minimal, yet adequate protections be discussed specifically and
 that the treaty should require scrutiny independent from law
 enforcement itself.
 
 The issue of costs is also troublesome. Under 15.3, countries are
 not required to pay the costs imposed on third parties for their
 demands for surveillance. This both significantly lowers to barriers
 to law enforcement surveillance by removing any limits on how
 much surveillance can be afforded and is grossly unfair to the
 providers.  Industry commenters have consistently asked for the
 inclusion of a reimbursement requirement, and those requests have
 been supported by the privacy community. Requiring that law
 enforcement pay for their surveillance provides an important level of
 accountability through the budget process each year. C.
 Encryption and Article 19.4 In the last few years, after considerable
 international debate over surveillance, privacy and electronic
 commerce, the use of encryption has been liberalized, except in a
 few authoritarian governments such as China and Russia.  Article
 19.4 is a step backwards by seemingly requiring that countries
 adopt laws that can force users to provide their encryption keys
 and the plain text of the encrypted files.
 
 So far, only a few countries, such as Singapore, Malaysia, India
 and the UK, have implemented such provisions in their laws. In
 those countries, police have the power to fine and imprison users
 who do not provide the keys or the plaintext of files or
 communications to police. It is worth noting that the UK
 Government faced significant opposition over its initiative; including
 an ambiguous paragraph within an internationally-binding
 convention is in conflict with democratic principles.
 
 Such approaches raise issues involving the right against self-
 incrimination, which is respected in many countries worldwide. The
 privilege against self-incrimination forbids a government official from
 compelling a person to testify against himself. It has a long history,
 originally developing from Roman and Canon law and has
 subsequently been adopted in the Common law of many countries.
 Many European legal scholars also believe that requiring such
 disclosures violates the European Convention on Human Rights.
 
 The proposed treaty should unambiguously provide that there is no
 requirement that parties have domestic legislation that forces users
 to provide encryption keys or to decrypt documents.
 
 D. Interception and Real-time Traffic Data Articles 20 (Real-time
 collection of traffic data) and Article 21 (Interception of content
 data) mandate that the parties have domestic laws requiring service
 providers to cooperate in both the collection of traffic data and the
 content of communications. Without sufficient privacy and due
 process protections, which are noticeably lacking in the Treaty,
 these provisions threaten human rights.
 
 Both Articles also mandate in their respective Sections A that the
 parties shall adopt such legislative and other measures to empower
 their law enforcement authorities to directly collect or record such
 content and traffic data without the participation of the service
 provider.
 
 Allowing law enforcement direct access to a service provider's
 network to conduct surveillance, e.g., the U.S. Carnivore program,
 provides police with the ability to conduct broad sweeps of network
 communications with only their unsupervised assurance that they
 will only collect that data which they are lawfully entitled to collect.
 It invites abuse of the most invasive investigative powers. It also
 represents a threat to the integrity of providers' networks. For
 example, the use of Carnivore in the US compromised the network
 integrity of a major ISP.
 
 E. Data Protection We would urge the CoE to adopt the sections
 under discussion in Article 29 and footnote 9 on data protection.
 Opposition to this section seems to come from a misunderstanding
 on the part of some countries about the issue of data protection. In
 this case, it is a requirement that the information is only used by
 governments for appropriate means. It is not a requirement that
 countries such as the US adopt legislation governing the use of
 personal information in the private sector. Many countries around
 the world already have legislation of this nature including the US
 Privacy Act.
 
 It should also be noted that other international agreements on the
 transfer of information between law enforcement agencies including
 the Interpol, Europol and Schengen agreements all include
 sections on the use of information.
 
 F.  On Mutual Assistance and Dual-Criminality We remain deeply
 concerned with the draft treaty's failure to consistently require dual
 criminality as a condition for mutual assistance.  No nation should
 ask another to interfere with the privacy of its citizens or to impose
 onerous requirements on its service providers to investigate acts,
 which are not a crime in the requested nation.  Governments
 should not investigate a citizen who is acting lawfully, regardless of
 whatever mutual assistance conventions are in place.
 
 At a minimum, if the CoE insists on not requiring dual criminality,
 then we recommend the addition of an article that has reporting
 requirements regarding such investigations of lawful activity.  Such
 an article should include reporting of each case of mutual
 assistance that did not involve dual criminality , as well as an
 accounting of all investigative 'product' of lawful activity that involved
 personal data that was shared with another country, and should
 require notification to the individual.
 
 Moreover, we believe that the CoE must explain with much greater
 specificity the situations and scenarios where parties are permitted
 to use the articulated reservations of political offences and
 prejudicing essential interests, and must differentiate these from
 general cases of investigations of an innocent individual for lawful
 acts. Importantly, the CoE also needs to explain why in Article 33
 (Real Time Collection of Traffic Data), the draft provides for neither a
 dual criminality constraint, nor even a 'political offence' and
 'essential interest' exemption, as do other articles.
 
 Finally, the interception article provides that interception is allowed
 to the extent permitted by other treaties and domestic law. Article
 18.5.b of the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in
 Criminal Matters, for example, allows the requested Member State
 to make its consent subject to any conditions, which would have to
 be observed in a similar national case. We recommend clarifying
 that within the CoE convention, requests for interception can only
 take place if it is permitted under the given criminal law as an
 offence that merits interception in both countries. We also favor a
 minimum-authorization request, where warrants are only acted
 upon if they are received from a judicial authority in the requested
 country. G.  Additional Protocol on Speech Crimes In Footnote 3.
 the PC-CY Committee discussed the possibility of including
 content-related offences other than those defined in Article 9, such
 as the distribution of racist propaganda through computer systems.
 [..]
 
 We would oppose the CoE taking forward a second protocol on
 other content-related crimes. Such a protocol will inevitably
 threaten recognized free expression rights in many nations.  This
 treaty should be confined to offences where there is universal
 agreement about criminality.  We are particularly concerned with
 the CoE as an organisation discussing these issues, if it is going
 to employ as closed a process as it has for its deliberations on this
 convention.
 
 
 H.  Other Brackets and Footnotes
 
 (i) Preamble: [Mindful also of [the need to reconcile the interests of
 international mutual assistance and] the protection of personal
 data, as conferred e.g. by the 1981 Council of Europe Convention
 for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic
 Processing of Personal Data];
 
 We support the outside brackets being removed, but recommend
 removing the internal clause regarding mutual assistance. We also
 support the inclusion of the further data protection instruments into
 the preamble.
 
 (ii) Footnotes 4 and 5, relating to "where such acts are committed
 wilfully, [at least] on a commercial scale and by means of a
 computer system":[...] Meanwhile, another delegation proposed the
 following alternative formulation: "Parties shall consider
 establishing as criminal offences conduct described in paragraphs
 1 and 2 in situations other than those which involve a commercial
 scale."
 
 We oppose the inclusion of the "[at least]", as it increases the
 scope of applicability. We also disagree with the inclusion of the
 alternative formulation proposed by the 'other delegation' mentioned
 in footnote 4.
 
 (iii) Footnote 6. Two delegations requested that a reservation
 clause be included to Articles 20 and 21 to the extent these
 provisions under their domestic laws cannot apply to certain types
 of service providers.
 
 We support this reservation clause, and recommend tightening the
 definition of traffic data within article 20 particularly considering the
 various types of service providers that could arguably be covered.
 
 (iv) Footnote 9. See our discussion above under "Data Protection".
 
 (v) Footnote 10: It was suggested by several delegations that
 "may" be replaced by "shall" with regard to paragraph b). One
 delegation proposed to replace "may" by "shall" in both paragraphs
 a) and b).
 
 We support replacing "may" with "shall", particularly in the light of
 our discussion above under "Data Protection". Conclusion We
 thank you for this latest opportunity to respond to the convention.
 We feel that without due consideration to civil liberties, privacy, and
 due process this convention will continue to threaten fundamental
 human rights. We look forward to further discussing the matter with
 you.
 
 David Banisar and Gus Hossein Privacy International
 
 
 Barry Steinhardt American Civil Liberties Union
 
 
 David Sobel Electronic Privacy Information Center
 
 
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 edited by Harkank
 published on: 2001-06-13
 comments to office@quintessenz.at
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